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Cold War, ‘Thaw’ and ‘Everlasting 
Friendship’: Soviet Mountaineers and 
Mount Everest, 1953–1960  
Eva Maurer  
In 1953, two events affected the community of Soviet mountaineers each in their 
own way. Stalin died and the world’s highest summit, Mount Everest, was 
climbed for the ﬁrst time. This article traces how the story of Everest’s conquest 
was transmitted to the Soviet public: a slow process reﬂecting the transition from 
Stalinist isolation to Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’. Between 1954 and 1960, the ﬁrst 
personal contacts with Everest expedition leader John Hunt then opened up a 
window to the world (not only) for Soviet mountaineers, while at the same time 
the blossoming Sino-Soviet friendship of the mid1950s enabled Soviet 
mountaineers to prepare for their own, however unsuccessful, Sino-Soviet 
Everest Expedition. Everest acted as a catalyst for increasing contacts between 
East and West, capitalist and communist climbers, which provided new chances 
for comparison and self-reﬂection and thus contributed to the emergence of new 
discourses of identity and community within Soviet mountaineering.  
On 5 March 1953, Stalin died. Not even two months later, on 29 May, Mount 
Everest was climbed for the ﬁrst time. While those events were unrelated and 
obviously of a very different nature, they both had a strong effect on one small 
group of Soviet citizens: the Soviet mountaineers or al’pinisty as they were 
referred to in Russian. Within a short time, their two most important systems of 
reference were challenged: the monolithic Stalinist civilization, which had 
extended even to the ﬁelds of leisure and sports, suddenly ended and the 
conquest of the world’s highest summit refocused the attention of Soviet 
mountaineers to the transnational mountaineering community in which their own 
place was now to be retaken and redefined. Stalin’s death can be considered a 
historical event in the sense that its impact was to change structures profoundly. 
For Soviet al’pinisty it eventually opened up new possibilities for communication 
and ﬁnally, interaction, with mountaineers abroad. The processes of 
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de-Stalinization also facilitated the rehabilitation of Soviet mountaineers 
persecuted during the Great Terror of the 1930s and thereby a reconstruction of 
a group memory. All these changes did not occur immediately but evolved 
slowly, over a period of insecurity and search for reactions, new solutions, new 
discourses of identity and community. [1]  
Everest can be regarded as a catalyst for these processes, and its analysis 
provides us with a prism through which we can trace efforts of reorientation after 
Stalin’s death in Soviet society. While the conquest of the world’s highest summit 
put an end to the ambitions of many other high-altitude teams, for the Soviet 
mountaineers it really meant the beginning of a new phase of activity – to the 
extent of making their own plans for an Everest ascent together with Chinese 
colleagues in the context of Sino-Soviet friendship. The discourse about Everest 
thus gave Soviet mountaineers, and to a certain extent other Soviet citizens, a 
chance of talking about socialism and capitalism, about their community and 
their visions for the future.  
This article will focus on the years from the British ascent of Everest in 1953 to 
the Chinese ascent of the same summit in 1960. After a short overview of the 
development of Soviet mountaineering during the Stalin era, it will ﬁrst 
demonstrate how the conquest of Everest was communicated to the Soviet 
people – both to mountaineers and the general public – and what reactions 
resulted from this during the years 1953–4. The article will address the evolution 
of contacts between Soviet and British mountaineers, which ranged from an 
increasing use of foreign literature to personal encounters, before moving on to a 
discussion of the subsequent Soviet attempt on Everest. Finally, it will examine 
how the changing discourses of Soviet mountaineering can be read as a 
metaphor for the changes in Soviet society during the years of the ‘Thaw’.  
The Importance of Difference: ‘Soviet’ Mountaineering Under Stalinism  
Modern mountaineering had been introduced to pre-Revolutionary Russia from 
Western Europe only at the end of the nineteenth century but never gained the 
popularity it enjoyed in countries such as Germany, France or Switzerland. The 
reasons for this were manifold: not only was transportation and infrastructure in 
the mountain regions of the Tsarist empire still lacking or in a bad state; long 
distances between the urban regions and the climbing areas also hindered 
regular trips. Russia also lacked that speciﬁc and substantial European middle 
class or (Bildungs)bürgertum, which made up the bulk of membership in 
Europe’s climbing clubs. [2] Thus, al’pinizm remained at ﬁrst a pastime of a 
rather narrow circle of urban elite and intelligentsia in Moscow and a few other 
cities. When in the 1920s a few enthusiasts rallied and gained state support for 
‘proletarian’ mountaineering, it was necessary to shed all associations with a 
once bourgeois activity and its former practitioners, who were now denounced by 
the new regime.  
For many years to come, Soviet mountaineering was therefore constructed in 
opposition to Russia’s pre-Revolutionary past as well as to Western climbing: 
Not only was Soviet mountaineering required to be accessible to the masses, 
especially to young Soviet workers, it should also be collective (as opposed to 
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individualist) in form as well as in spirit. Last but not least, it was to be an integral 
part of the allencompassing socialist project in the Soviet Union. Skilfully latching 
onto broader trends in discourse, iconography and public culture, mountaineers 
presented themselves as cultural ambassadors to the periphery, helping to build 
socialism during the ﬁrst Five-Year-Plan (1928–32), then switched to a more 
heroic iconography during the mid-1930s and depicted the mountains as another 
theatre where Soviet men successfully fought against natural obstacles. Finally 
the slogan ‘A mountaineer has to be a soldier!’ was adopted during the high tide 
of military patriotism as the war approached. [3] After the Second World War, 
however, militarization subsided quickly, and continued political engagement on 
the part of Soviet citizens was neither required nor encouraged by the regime. 
However, even as a more ‘private’ activity, leisure continued to be politicized in 
order to strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as a welfare state, providing its 
citizens with the ‘good life’ their capitalist fellow workers reputedly could only 
dream of. [4]  
 
In addition, the arena of sports rapidly became a focus of ofﬁcial interest as an 
alternative symbolic battleﬁeld of the systems during the Cold War. In order to 
proﬁt from this trend, mountaineering after 1945 underwent a process of 
self-‘sportization’ (sportizatsia), and Soviet mountaineers went to great lengths to 
make their own pastime resemble other competitive sports. They introduced 
nationwide championships in rock-climbing and subsequently national prizes in 
different categories such as traverses or high-altitude expeditions. [5] Unlike 
other sports, mountaineering remained physically conﬁned within the limits of the 
Soviet Union. Soviet mountaineers could not climb abroad nor could foreigners 
come to visit the Caucasus or Pamir mountains. Direct if informal contacts with 
Western mountaineers in the Caucasus had taken place regularly until the 
mid-1930s, but after the Second World War, foreign climbers were no longer 
allowed to visit and the ﬂow of information between Soviet and foreign climbers 
had run dry. [6] A Swiss mountaineering yearbook aptly titled its sketchy 
overview on Soviet mountaineering in 1948 ‘Behind the Russian Curtain’; indeed, 
Western mountaineers had almost no knowledge of the achievements of their 
Soviet colleagues. [7] To re-establish communication and to compete with the 
international mountaineering community became possible only after 1953.  
 
From Ignoring the Fact to Denouncing its Importance: Soviet 
Reactions to the Everest Expedition, 1953–4  
The success of the Everest expedition was made public on the coronation day of 
Queen Elizabeth II in London, on 2 June 1953. Led by the Briton John Hunt, the 
team’s composition seemed to celebrate the successful transition from British 
Empire to Commonwealth in that one of the ﬁrst two men setting foot on Everest, 
Edmund Hillary, was from the now sovereign state of New Zealand, while the 
citizenship of Sherpa Tenzing Norgay was claimed by both India and Nepal. The 
symbolic value of man’s victory over nature was turned into hard cash by 
extensive media coverage and books, ﬁlms and interviews [8] to the extent that 
‘Everest’ eventually became a brand name for Italian wine and double-glazing for 
windows, as Hunt later recalled. [9] Today, Everest is remembered most of all 
through its extensive photographic (and ﬁlm) coverage and in many ways, this 
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ascent was one of the ﬁrst Western media events. The images popularized here 
have entered the collective visual memory of the Western world in a way that 
would be echoed by Armstrong’s ﬁrst step on the moon in 1969.  
 
However, these images of Everest did not reach the Soviet people. On 3 June 
1953, a very short notice in Izvestia informed its readers that ‘According to 
information from the . . . camp, a member of the British Expedition, the New 
Zealander Hillary and the local guide Tenzing had reached the summit of Everest 
on 29 May’. [10] There were no pictures in any major newspaper or magazine in 
the Soviet Union, nor did those media provide any further information on the 
conquest. Sovetski Sport, the most widely read sports newspaper in the Soviet 
Union, did not even mention Everest at any time during that year. [11] Instead, it 
featured articles on the 30th anniversary of Soviet al’pinizm as a system for the 
mass production of the new ‘Soviet man’ whose will was ‘steeled’ on the 
mountain slopes, and where mountaineering was presented as a unique and 
distinctly Soviet activity, taking place in the mountains at the periphery of the 
Soviet Union: from the ‘wooded Carpathians to the ﬁre-spewing volcanoes of 
Kamtchatka, from the rocky cliffs of Crimea to the snows of Altai’. [12]  
It is doubtful whether the Soviet regime thought it could remain forever silent 
on the conquest of Everest. The initial refusal to react to the event must be 
attributed to the overwhelming sense of insecurity of how to deal with the 
expected, anticipated or slowly discernible changes after Stalin’s death; changes 
the extent and direction of which nobody could really foresee in the summer of 
1953. Ofﬁcials certainly underestimated the strong interest of the Soviet public in 
the expedition. When, at the insistence of his readers, the sports journalist 
Evgeni Simonov ﬁnally dealt with the topic in the pages of Sovetski Sport in May 
1954, almost one year after the event, he still relied on Stalinist rhetoric and 
presented it as a victory of British ‘imperialists’. The true fame, Simonov said, 
belonged to the Sherpa, the ‘nameless coolies’ who had carried everything for 
their masters, ‘sunk in the deep snow, suffering from cold and high-altitude 
sickness. Innocent and honest, enduring and fulﬁlling their deed to the last! Such 
are these sons of the mountains. . . . And who knows how this expedition would 
have ended without Tenzing,’ Simonov asked. Tenzing Norgay had shown ‘what 
new powers are maturing among the peoples of rising Asia. It is but fair . . . that 
one of their sons was among the ﬁrst to reach the highest spot of his homeland 
and the whole world.’ [13] Tenzing’s part in the expedition allowed Simonov to 
combine the classic Stalinist ‘transformation narrative’ with a contemporary 
political message: ‘The Soviet Union would support and accompany ‘‘rising Asia’’ 
on its way into a bright future.’ Typically, although ‘Everest’ had been the 
commonly used name in Soviet mountaineering literature all through the 1930s, 
ofﬁcial post-war discourses used the mountain’s indigenous name 
‘Chomolungma’ to clearly take side with the nation on whose territory it stood. 
[14] Simonov’s description of the ‘innocent and honest’ ‘coolies’, however, shows 
a rather traditional Stalinist-paternalist orientalism in its slightly condescending 
treatment of the Asian participants, notwithstanding the updated Cold War 
rhetoric. [15]  
The conquest of Everest was thus publicly acknowledged, but its importance 
played down. In 1949, the chairman of the ofﬁcial body of representation for all 
Soviet mountaineers, the ‘All-Union Section for Mountaineering’ (Vsesoiuznaia 
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sektsia alpinizma, or VSA) had still boasted that ‘comparing the ascents of Soviet 
sportsmen in 1948 with what was done in foreign countries throughout the whole 
pre-war period, we can with due pride point to the achievements of our masters 
which undoubtedly trump the best ascents of foreign climbers.’ [16]  
After 1953, such statements were obviously no longer appropriate. The new 
discourse thus turned away from achievements and results and focused on an 
allegedly better Soviet practice; thereby upholding the notion that Soviet climbing 
was fundamentally different. Several articles even more explicitly denounced 
foreign mountaineers’ use of porters and support teams to achieve their goals. In 
Soviet mountaineering, for example in the 1954 ascent of Peak Revolution (Pik 
Revoliutsii) in the Pamir (6987m), there were ‘no leaders and no led ones’:  
Let us remember that in 1953 two people climbed Everest: the 
Englishman [sic] Hillary and the Sherpa Tenzing. They were supported 
by approximately 400 ‘support troops’, most of all by porters. The Soviet 
mountaineers – the 20 participants of the main expedition – had only a 
few direct helpers. . . . All the major baggage the climbers bore on their 
shoulders. [17]  
In fact, this heroic deed was partly due to the refusal of the local kolkhoz ‘Red 
Border Guard’ to provide the expedition with as many packing animals as they 
had promised. Thus the climbers had simply no other choice than to carry 
everything themselves. [18] Soviet expedition mountaineering during the 1930s 
had relied on local support probably just as much as Himalayan mountaineering 
did [19] but emphasizing the (ideologically charged) renunciation of local porters 
stressed not only the ‘progressive’ attitude towards non-European nationalities 
and the supposedly collective and egalitarian nature of Soviet mountaineering; it 
also made the sportive effort of Soviet mountaineers seem greater.  
Again, Soviet mountaineering was constructed as different and (at least 
morally) superior while foreign achievements were belittled. Mountaineering thus 
appears as a Cold War sports substitute for ofﬁcial policy, where any victory was 
to be primarily judged on the basis of the political allegiance of the climbers. 
However, the fact that the Soviet media had found it necessary to deal with a 
major foreign media event, even though it had no direct political or economic 
impact on the Soviet Union, was to open the door for further interpretation. At the 
same time, advertising Soviet mountaineering as a sport of equal partners with 
‘no leaders’ broke with the focus on strict military-style discipline within climbers’ 
teams that had dominated through the later Stalin years. This rhetoric was to 
develop a life of its own, a point to which we will return.  
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Communication and Community Building: Contacts with Western 
Mountaineers, 1954–8  
While the broad public discourse was still busy denouncing Western climbing 
achievements, the Soviet mountaineering yearbooks – written mostly by climbers 
for climbers – offered a more variegated approach. While one author in 1954 still 
accused the Vatican of ﬁnancing imperialism under the cover of mountaineering 
in the Himalaya and everyone else of spying on the Soviet borders in Asia, [20] 
there were also some very sober discussions of the Everest expeditions of 1952 
and 1953, which limited their critique to tactical errors and technical flaws. [21] 
This turned to a more technical description – very much obsessed with the 
equipment used by the ‘West’ – and may have stemmed partly from the 
ideological vacuum left by Stalin’s death, but its outcome was to change Soviet 
alpine literature in content, form and style. Authors slowly retreated from an 
ideological interpretation of the Himalayan expeditions to an assessment based 
on the criteria of failure or success and then to a seemingly more ‘neutral’ arena 
of sport, emphasizing the significance of the material and tactical preparation of 
any expedition.  
Mountaineers also had access to privileged and additional information and 
were thus earlier and better informed than ordinary Soviet citizens. In the autumn 
of 1953, climbers in Tiﬂis had already been given a detailed talk on the conquest 
of Everest by Simonov, the above-mentioned sports journalist and editor of the 
mountaineering yearbook. At the beginning of 1954 the British embassy in 
Moscow organized a viewing of the ofﬁcial Everest ﬁlm to which it invited Soviet 
mountaineers, [22] and in June 1954 John Hunt himself came to Moscow and 
gave a lecture on the expedition. The British embassy had tried to obtain 
permission to make this a public event, but without success. Not even Hunt’s 
presence in Moscow was made public.  
[23] Only ten carefully selected Soviet mountaineers were allowed as guests, 
some of whom had come all the way from Georgia to hear the talk. [24] 
Nevertheless, Hunt’s presentation not only initiated personal contacts that were 
to evolve into cultural exchange and lasting friendships, it also helped to instigate 
a more open and uncensored ﬂow of information to the broader Soviet public in 
which mountaineers acted as mediators.  
In 1956, a Russian translation of John Hunt’s book The Ascent of Everest 
(1954) was published in Moscow in a ﬁrst run of 30,000 copies, an exceptionally 
high ﬁgure which shows that the Soviet publishing house could count on great 
interest in anything ‘foreign’. It was the ﬁrst foreign book on Everest to appear in 
the Soviet Union since 1930 and was quickly followed by several other foreign 
books on Himalayan expeditions, including Tenzing’s ‘autobiography’ and the 
Italian Desio’s account of the ﬁrst ascent of K2. [25] All of these had been 
translated and edited by Soviet mountaineers, generally a very educated stratum 
of society, some of whom also wrote overviews on what was now called 
‘mountaineering abroad’ rather than ‘bourgeois’ or ‘capitalist’ climbing. [26]  
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Mountaineers had thus become cultural intermediaries between foreign 
mountaineering and a broader Soviet public, opening a window to the world’s 
events. Reviews of foreign books such as Maurice Herzog’s Annapurna could 
amount to 15-page synopses for those Soviet citizens who did not have direct 
access to the original. [27] As cultural exchanges between Great Britain and the 
USSR bloomed towards the end of the 1950s, Soviet authorities allowed more 
citizens access to the original voices of foreigners. When in 1958 the British 
climber Robert Charles Evans came to the Soviet Union, he could hold his 
lectures in the Soviet space of Moscow State University – a striking difference to 
Hunt’s visit only four years earlier, which had taken place in the British Embassy. 
[28] Mountaineering had developed into one of the ostensibly depoliticized areas 
for cultural contact between Soviet and foreign citizens and this was due mostly 
to the effort of mountaineers themselves.  
The personal meeting with Hunt in 1954 also served as a starting-point for an 
increasingly close exchange between British and Soviet mountaineers. [29] At 
ﬁrst, they stemmed from personal efforts of individual Soviet mountaineers such 
as the young Moscow doctor and mountaineer Evgeni Gippenreiter (born 1927) 
who became a central ﬁgure in future British-Soviet mountaineering relations. 
The VSA as the ofﬁcial body of representation remained reluctant at ﬁrst and did 
not ofﬁcially congratulate the Everest climbers. [30] This breach of 
mountaineering etiquette enraged one senior Soviet mountaineer, Sandro Gvalia 
from Georgia, and made him pen his own personal greetings to the British Alpine 
club, thereby openly defying the Soviet representational organ he had once 
served. Like many others, he compared the ﬁrst ascent to such ‘heroic deeds’ as 
the conquest of the North or South Poles. Hillary and Tenzing, he said, were like 
Peary and Scott, Nansen and Amundsen, Alesha Dzhaparidze and Evgeni 
Abalakov. By including these two well-known Soviet mountaineers, one a 
Georgian and the other a Siberian, he presented their achievements as equally 
outstanding in a virtual community of mountaineers which encompassed 
countries with different political regimes. [31]  
On an ofﬁcial level, Soviet mountaineering representatives received an 
invitation to lecture at the Alpine Club in London in 1956. Their acceptance was 
part of a new campaign to propagate Soviet mountaineering achievements 
internationally. In 1957, the ﬁrst comprehensive book on Soviet climbing 
achievements, written by a Soviet mountaineer, was published in France; during 
the same year the Soviet Union took an active part in the mountain ﬁlm festival in 
Trento, Italy. [32] For the visit to the Alpine Club, the well-known senior 
mountaineer Evgeni Beletski, a skilled metalworker from the famous Kirov works 
in Leningrad, was chosen as the ofﬁcial Soviet representative, probably also 
because of his exemplary biography which seemed to demonstrate the social 
accessibility of mountaineering in the Soviet Union. Gippenreiter, whose 
academic background was in fact much more typical for a Soviet climber, 
accompanied him. In his lecture, Beletski never questioned the basic precepts of 
Soviet climbing as it had evolved during the Stalinist 1930s – its integration into 
state structures, collective practice or usefulness for building socialism. [33] 
However, here as in other publications, the image of Soviet mountaineering was 
adapted to the changing discourses of the ‘Thaw’ period. While during the 1930s 
the emphasis had rested on massovost or the importance of quantity, attention 
was now directed on the efforts and achievements of the Khrushchev regime to 
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provide its citizens with a higher standard of living in an emerging ‘Socialist 
consumer society’. When Beletski declared that mountaineering in the USSR 
often united ‘miners and scientists, steelworkers and engineers’, he emphasized 
the country’s status as a modern industrial society, where class struggle had 
been overcome and all social groups were united in a common cause. [34]  
In Beletski’s London lecture, this integrative community was extended to 
embrace those mountaineers who had substantially contributed to the birth and 
growth of Soviet climbing in the 1930s – before they had become victims of the 
Stalinist terror in 1937–8. For the ﬁrst time in almost 20 years, their names and 
services were publicly remembered and the records they had achieved were 
(re)claimed as part of the history of Soviet mountaineering. The transnational 
dimension of Soviet mountaineering was remembered as well. Past cooperations 
such as the Soviet-German Pamir expedition in 1928 had long been a taboo 
topic, but now even the fact that the Germans had climbed Peak Lenin during 
that expedition was acknowledged.  
[35] Parallel to this new emphasis on the shared and interlinked history of Soviet 
and foreign mountaineering, the pre-Revolutionary roots of Soviet 
mountaineering were also given more attention. [36] Differences were still 
spelled out, but in the spirit of cultural contact they seemed of secondary 
importance when compared to mutual interests, common goals and even a partly 
shared history. Rituals surrounding the Soviet visit to London were to solidify this 
feeling. Among the gifts exchanged was a nylon rope – the material itself was a 
symbol of modernity – which was presented to the Soviet mountaineers for their 
planned ﬁrst ascent on foreign ground. It was to serve the expedition and to 
symbolize the connection between mountaineers from different countries. [37] 
Finally, after almost 20 years the Soviet Union reopened its borders to foreign 
climbers: One year after the lecture, in 1957, the British mountaineer Joyce 
Dunsheath visited the Soviet Union and climbed with Soviet mountaineers in the 
Caucasus; followed in 1958 by a British party led by John Hunt. [38]  
The emphasis on a friendly transnational community was fuelled by the 
enormous interest of mountaineers and ordinary Soviet citizens in the ascent of 
Everest, as both foreign and Soviet sources testify. Many readers requested 
more information from their newspapers; Tenzing Norgay received numerous 
letters from Soviet citizens; and the ﬁrst foreign mountaineers in the Soviet Union 
were inevitably questioned about details. [39] Joyce Dunsheath found her 
English edition of Tenzing’s autobiography an instant source of interest even to 
those who could not understand English because the photographic illustrations 
provided not only a way of communicating without a common language; they 
also served as a visible proof of another, different reality outside the Soviet 
borders. [40]  
John Hunt later compared the ‘unifying inﬂuence’ of Everest and its global 
appeal to the impact of Gagarin’s ﬁrst ﬂight into space a few years later, [41] and 
indeed the atmosphere described in 1957, when British and Soviet mountaineers 
discussed the launching of Sputnik, mankind’s ﬁrst satellite, on the slopes of 
Elbrus, caught this spirit of a common and shared vision of modernity that united 
and provided a meeting ground, a mutual basis for talk and exchange for Soviet 
and Western mountaineers. [42] What was ﬁrst voiced privately became the 
publicly sanctioned ‘general line’ on mountaineering abroad during the heyday of 
cultural exchange in 1958–9. The ofﬁcial discourse then changed faster than 
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books could be printed: When Simonov reviewed the translation of Hunt’s book 
in 1959, he still emphasized the effort of the many native support teams that 
were necessary to climb Everest. But he also insisted that ‘one should not belittle 
the heroic efforts of the British mountaineers’ as some other authors (former 
Stalinist mountaineering ofﬁcials) had done, since the expedition leaders had 
managed a great feat: creating a strong collective, a community of diversity, 
‘from the noble [svetskii] gentleman Hunt to the almost illiterate but loyal 
inhabitants of the far-off mountain villages of Nepal’. [43]  
 
Covert Competition: Sino-Soviet Plans for Everest  
In a complete reversal of the earlier Stalinist discourse on al’pinizm, 
mountaineering’s private aspect was now publicly staged, emphasizing a sense 
of community and friendship among individuals and downplaying political 
connotations. This does not mean that the competitive aspects and symbolic 
functions of climbing to boost national prestige were disregarded, but they were 
pursued rather covertly. By the early 1950s, Soviet climbers were quite frustrated 
about lagging behind in high altitude mountaineering. [44] Since 1945 they had 
been trying to gain permission to cross the border and participate in the 
international race for the highest summits which had been re-opened after the 
Second World War. Conquering Nanga Parbat and K2 by 1950 were among the 
targets ﬁrst stated as internal goals in 1946. [45] Such goals were ambitious, but 
not completely illusionary, given the experience of Soviet climbers in altitudes up 
to almost 7500m. However, climbing had to compete with other, more 
prestigious, competitive sports where the Soviet Union could score highly in 
international competitions, and it attracted neither much attention nor substantial 
resources from the Soviet sports bureaucracy. [46] Mountaineers had thus 
resorted to Cold War rhetoric, [47] as when they asked for money and 
permission to stage their ﬁrst ever expedition to a foreign mountain, Mustag-Ata 
in China, pointing out that ‘the fame of this summit in all countries of the world, 
and the failed attempt on it by the well-known English high altitude climbers 
Shipton and Tilman would make [our] victory . . . an event of international 
importance’. [48]  
Only in the mid-1950s, when blooming Sino-Soviet friendship led to massive 
Soviet support for Chinese sports development, did the doors suddenly open. 
[49] To fulﬁl their long-harboured plans to climb abroad, mountaineers suggested 
‘inviting the Chinese comrades’. [50] Soviet and Chinese climbers trained 
together in the Pamir in 1955 and in 1956 they successfully climbed Mustag-Ata 
and Kungur in China, celebrating their ﬁrst victory on foreign soil. But most of all, 
China’s annexation of Tibet in 1951 had also placed Mount Everest’s northern 
approaches within the Communist realm of Sino-Soviet ‘eternal friendship’.  
In the autumn of 1958, the Chinese formally invited their Soviet colleagues on 
a joint Everest ascent from the north side. [51] With the help of ‘a phone call from 
the [Soviet] Central committee’ a yet unknown level of state support was 
mobilized. New equipment was constructed (including even oxygen apparatus, a 
novelty in the USSR), and qualiﬁed mountaineers were given leave of absence 
from work at short notice to train and to undertake reconnaissance missions. [52] 
The Chinese authorities organized a special support committee, ordered military 
units to protect their reconnaissance and built a road to the proposed base camp 
at Rongbuk in Tibet.  
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[53] During the autumn of 1958, Russian and Chinese mountaineers were 
already training together in the Pamir. In November, a joint reconnaissance party 
of Soviet and Chinese climbers examined the area around Rongbuk glacier, and 
in the early spring of 1959 the participants met again in the Caucasus to train in 
conditions of severe cold and snow. However, when the Soviet participants met 
on 18 March 1959 in Moscow, a few days before they were to ﬂy to Beijing, they 
were told that the expedition had been cancelled at the last minute, due to the 
uprising in Tibet that had begun on 10 March and made an expedition in the area 
impossible. It was to be an early harbinger of the ﬁnal Sino-Soviet split.  
A year later, the Chinese extended their invitation again but this time it was the 
Soviet side that turned down the offer due to the increasing political tension. [54] 
In May 1960, Chinese mountaineers reached the summit alone, and their Soviet 
colleagues could only congratulate, however grudgingly: ‘One is always glad 
about the success of a friend.’ [55]  
Conclusion: Sports as a Metaphor for Life  
Accounts by Soviet climbers of Soviet-Chinese climbing meetings are highly 
ambivalent and prove an insightful comparison with the cultural contacts with the 
West. Unlike the latter, which were staged as meetings between individuals, 
Soviet-Chinese climbing expeditions were a state affair, organized to prove the 
supremacy of the Communist system. [56] The 1958 reconnaissance was 
organized through the Chinese party apparatus from Beijing and kept secret not 
only from the world public: neither the local Tibetan government nor the lamas 
were to be informed about their presence and their goals. Whilst the amount of 
state effort put into the undertaking in some ways impressed the Soviets (who 
were used to being neglected by the state), many aspects made them doubt the 
timing and adequacy of their organization.  
The acute tension and fear of rebellion in Tibet showed the limits of the 
Communist state project. Even the local party administrator openly admitted to 
the Soviet participants that ‘the [Tibetan] people do not understand us’. [57] How 
would the monks at Rongbuk monastery, who were helpful and friendly towards 
Chinese and Soviet al’pinisty, react when the government built a road directly to 
the foot of their holy mountain, a Soviet mountaineer wondered? [58] Neither 
were Soviet climbers enthusiastic about the prospect of climbing in the uniforms 
of the People’s Liberation Army nor carrying pistols with them, but they were 
constantly surrounded by party ofﬁcials from Beijing and military escorts, with 
ofﬁcialdom much more pronounced than in the expeditions Soviet climbers were 
used to. The Chinese expedition plans were formidable but not ﬂexible enough to 
meet the actual needs of the task. It was the three Soviet mountaineers who 
convinced the others that a small, mobile reconnaissance unit made up primarily 
of climbers would do better than the large-scale expedition assault the Chinese 
had in mind. [59]  
Since Soviet-Chinese relations rested almost exclusively on allegedly identical 
political systems, unexpected differences between the two versions of ‘socialism’ 
were all the more striking. They brought Soviet climbers to reﬂect on the nature 
of their own society at least as much (or even more) as during and after their 
contacts with climbers from Western countries. Among Soviet mountaineers, the 
Sino-Soviet cooperation had been a marriage of convenience from the start. 
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They found themselves not only in the role of the ‘elder brother’ commonly 
attributed to all Soviet ‘experts’ during the phase of cultural exchange between 
China and the Soviet Union, but in a very literal sense as well. While the Chinese 
climbers were mostly in their 20s, the Soviet delegation leader Beletski was 
already 50 and his fellow-climber Lev Filimonov was 39 years old. Soviet 
mountaineering was also built on decades of tradition and experience, while in 
China the sport had been introduced only a few years earlier under Soviet 
guidance. [60] In a way the Soviet climbers thus stood for another more mature 
approach, not only to climbing but also to life, because they had already 
experienced the phase of enthusiastic, large-scale building of socialism with all 
its consequences. Among other documents, the recently-published 
conversations between Mao and Khrushchev have made the cultural frictions in 
the Sino-Soviet relationship in the late 1950s evident. With the Chinese regime 
about to embark on economic and social experiments from which the Soviet 
Union was just about to dissociate itself, the two systems seemed to be moving 
in different time zones. [61]  
This feeling is also discernible, if not always consciously articulated, in 
mountaineers’ accounts. Filimonov felt as if he was travelling in time, alienated 
not only by the ‘medieval’ aspects of life in Lhasa, but also by the modestly and 
uniformly dressed people on China’s streets. This was a stark contrast to the 
emerging Soviet consumer society advocated by Khrushchev in those years. [62] 
Writing about the Chinese mountaineers they trained, another Soviet climber 
later remembered:  
When I looked at them more closely, I understood that our brothers 
were not only no mountaineers, but no sportsmen at all. The party had 
directed them to this work front, strength and mountain experience had 
been replaced by political conviction and literacy, by devotion to the 
party. . . . It would be a sin to mock at them; we have lived under the 
iron yoke for many years, too. [63]  
 
Typically, a Soviet mountaineer described the Chinese in 1956 as ‘good 
friends, modest, hard-working, enduring’, [64] and another in 1958 credited them 
with ‘outstanding love of work, the will to succeed, high sense of duty’. [65] While 
these were the standard attributes of a Stakhanovite of the 1930s, they were not 
speciﬁcally qualities appropriate for mountaineers but rather described the ‘New 
Man’ of the Stalin era. The Chinese ‘brothers’ depicted here were good socialists 
but they did not have any individual features – which were, in Soviet eyes, what 
made a mountaineer and a sportsman. This becomes especially obvious if we 
compare it to an account of two Soviet members of an all-Soviet expedition to 
Peak Stalin in 1959. They wrote about the reason for their success: ‘25 people – 
that is 25 characters . . . [every one] already had his habits, his style in 
mountaineering. . . . The [team leader’s] great merit was that he was able to ﬁnd 
a ‘‘key’’ to each character to form a strong . . . collective.’ [66]  
What Simonov had praised in Hunt’s expedition – that very different 
participants had joined forces for a collective success – was taken one step 
further here. These authors were convinced that success was only possible if 
leaders took into account and allowed for the individuality of all participants. It 
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seems obvious that this model was not just applicable to mountaineering 
expeditions. The need and the wish to incorporate different and potentially 
conﬂicting sub-groups by allowing for more individual deviation from the strict 
Stalinist stereotypes went much further. The search for a new form of socialism 
was accentuated even more when its ‘old’ forms seemed suddenly and visibly 
revived in the contact with the Chinese ‘brothers’ who represented in many ways 
a Stalinist past from which many wanted to break free. Thus the Soviet verdict 
that the Chinese were no ‘sportsmen’ also shows the signiﬁcance of sports as a 
metaphor for modern life. [67] This modernity contained not only the possibility of 
contacts and competition with the West but also a plea for more participation 
from ‘below’; for less pronounced hierarchies and most of all for more tolerance 
towards individual differences and approaches. Talking about China was talking 
about the past of socialism: talking about Western mountaineering was about its 
present and its future.  
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[1] As Sewell argues, ‘historical events are never instantaneous happenings: they always have a 
duration. . . . During this period, the usual articulations between different structures become 
profoundly dislocated. Actors, consequently, are beset with insecurity: they are unsure about 
how to get on with life.’ Sewell, Logics of History, 229. On the incoherent, ‘diffuse processes 
of revision and reform’ that de-Stalinization denotes see Jones, ‘Introduction: The Dilemmas’, 
3. 
[2] Recent historical analyses of mountaineering as a cultural and social phenomenon include, 
among others, Günther, Alpine Quergänge; Hoibian, Les alpinistes en France; Ambrosi and 
Wedekind, L’invenzione di un cosmo borghese; Hansen, ‘Albert Smith’ (and other articles by 
the same author).  
[3] V. Kudinov, ‘Al’pinist dolzhen byt’ boitsom’, Sovetski turizm i al’pinizm, 4 Aug. 1940, 2.  
[4] These developments  are discussed in detail in my dissertation on Soviet mountaineering 
during the Stalin era; Maurer, ‘Wege zum Pik Stalin’, passim, for an overview see Maurer, 
‘Al’pinizm as Mass Sport’.  
[5] Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii [State archive of the Russian Federation; 
hereafter GARF], f. 7576, op. 14, d. 40, ll. 27-28 (1948); Rototaev, K vershinam, 134.  
[6] For an overview of foreign climbers’ visits to the Caucasus see Salkeld and Bermúdez, On the 
Edge of Europe, 219–42.  
[7] ‘Hinter dem Russischen Vorhang’. This may have led to rumours that a Russian party in 1952 
had attempted to take Everest from the north. While these rumours in fact accelerated British 
planning for the expedition of 1953, recent research shows no trace of such an expedition. 
However, it is revealing that some Soviet mountaineers were actually willing to believe them 
at ﬁrst – demonstrating not only their conﬁdence in the Western press, but also a deep 
distrust towards their own sports system which they held thoroughly capable of organizing a 
secret expedition without involving mountaineers’ ofﬁcial organs of representation: 
Gippenreiter, ‘Mount Everest’, 109–11.  
[8] For an extensive discussion see Hansen, ‘Confetti of Empire’, passim.  
[9] Hunt, Life Is Meeting, 123.  
[10]  Izvestia, 3 June 1953, 4.  
[11] The information appeared in a few other Soviet papers, but always well hidden among the 
short news. For Krasnaia Zvezda on 4 June 1953, see Hansen, ‘Confetti of Empire’, 331  
n.93. Most major newspapers and sports/tourism journals did not publish any information at 
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all.  
[12] E. Simonov, ‘Al’pinisty vyshli v gory’, Sovetski Sport, 27 June 1953, 2. (All translations by the 
author).  
[13] E. Simonov, ‘Shturm vysochaishchei vershiny zemli’, Sovetski Sport, 8 May 1954, 3.  
[14] The same was true for K2 which was now popularly known as ‘Chog-Ori’. However, Soviet 
mountaineers on their reconnaissance in 1958 would still use the name ‘Everest’: Filimonov, 
‘Doroga na Everest’, 92.  
[15] Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, 93f.  
[16] Zatulovskii, ‘Itogi’, 16.  
[17] ‘Odinnadtsat’ na vershine’, Sovetski Sport, 25 Sept. 1954, 4. No author is given, but style and 
rhetoric point to Simonov once again.  
[18] Expedition report, 9 Sept. 1954, GARF f. 5451, op. 32, d. 470, l. 25.  
[19] When in 1933 Soviet climbers had scaled the highest Soviet summit, Peak Stalin (now Pik 
Ismoil Somoni, 7495m), for the ﬁrst time, they also had made use of local porters: Romm, The 
Ascent of Mount Stalin, passim.  
[20] ‘The time of legal mountaineering espionage trips to China has irrevocably passed. . . . The 
Himalaya now belongs to the peoples living there who want to live in peace and friendship 
with the peoples of India, Pakistan and the all adjoining countries.’ Ermashev, ‘V gimalaiakh’, 
483f.  
[21] Dorofeev and Bashmachnikov, ‘Na Chomolungmu’; Losev and Suslov, ‘Voskhozhdenie na 
Chomolungmu v 1953 godu’.  
[22] Foreign Ofﬁce (hereafter FO) 371/111761, National Archives, Kew, London.  
[23] There was no mention of Hunt’s visit in the press, although Izvestia paid due attention to the 
expanding Soviet-British contacts, see Izvestia, 12 March, 4 April and 2 Dec. 1954, 4; see 
also FO 371/111761.  
[24] John Hunt at a press conference after his return: The Times, 15 June 1954, 5; see also 
Gippenreiter, ‘Mount Everest’, 109.  
[25] Simonov, ‘Na vysshei tochke’, 362 fn. 3. These books included Tigr snegov: Avtobiograﬁia 
Tenzinga, zapisannaia s ego slov Dzh. R. Ul’manom, per. s. angl. (Moscow 1957); Dezio, A. 
‘K2’ – vtoraia vershina mira. Per. s. nem./Vved. F. Kropfa i B. Upeneka (Moscow 1959); Tikhi, 
G. Choi-Oiiu – milost’ bogov: Alpinistiskii pokhod v Gimalai, 1954 g. Per. s. nem.; predislovie 
B. Upeneka (Moscow 1960). Their ﬁrst editions ran to between 10,000 and 27,000 copies.  
[26] Garf and Kropf,  Al’pinizm za rubezhom. One year later, the VSA’s long-time president 
presented another volume: Rototaev, Pokorenie gigantov. Other Himalayan-related publica-
tions included ‘revelations’ on the Yeti, see Simonov, ‘Na vysshei tochke’, 363 fn. 1.  
[27] Kropf and Rototaev, ‘Kak byl pobezhden’, 361–76. Over a quarter of all pages was devoted to 
foreign mountaineering.  
[28] E. Simonov, ‘Druzhba smelykh’, Kultura i zhizn’ 7 (1958), 47.  
[29] Hunt, Life is Meeting, 144f. See also FO 371/111761 (quoted in Gippenreiter, ‘Mount Everest’).  
[30] They did so only in 1954: FO 371/111825; see online catalogue (‘Congratulations from the 
Soviet Union to the UK Alpine Club on the conquest of Everest’, 1954).  
[31] Correspondence in:  Alpine Journal 59 (1953–4), 366–7. The name of the author given is 
‘Paliya’, but he can be easily identiﬁed by his listing of titles and functions. Both Dzhaparidze 
(d. 1945) and Abalakov (d. 1948) died prematurely under tragic circumstances for which some 
have blamed the Soviet authorities, and have subsequently achieved a certain martyr status 
within the Soviet mountaineering community. This adds another dimension to mentioning 
these two which cannot be explored further here.  
[32] Tchérépov, Alpinisme soviétique; M. Anufrikov, ‘Festival v Trento’, Fizkul’tura i sport 2 (1958), 
20–1. The lecture at the Alpine Club took place only a few weeks after Khrushchev’s ﬁrst visit 
to England: Talbott and Crankshaw, Chruschtschow erinnert sich, 404–16. For one of the ﬁrst 
private visits during the cultural exchange between Great Britain and the USSR see Gilburd, 
‘Books and Borders’.  
[33] I refer to the published version: Beletsky, ‘Mountaineering in the USSR’; the text can also be 
found in GARF f. 7576, op. 30, d. 152.  
[34] Beletsky, ‘Mountaineering in the USSR’, 316. Beletskii’s exemplary Soviet vita was highlighted 
in a review of his books: Ogonek, 17 April 1952, 11.  
[35] Beletsky, ‘Mountaineering in the USSR’, 323, 326.  
[36] See Dorofeev, ‘S N.V. Krylenko’ and ‘Russkoe Gornoe Obshchestvo’.  
14 
 
[37] Zamiatin, Pik Beletskogo, ch. 10.  
[38] See Hunt and Brasher, The Red Snows.  
[39] B. Dorofeev and E. Basmachnikov, ‘Chto kroetsia za shturmom Dzhomolungmy’: Fizkul’tura i 
sport 4 (1953), 30–1; B.S. Bugaev, ‘Druzhba voskhoditelei’, 352; Dunsheath, Guest of the 
Soviets, 107–8, 115.  
[40] Dunsheath, Guest of the Soviets, 97. For the great interest Soviet citizens showed in reports 
from abroad and especially the signiﬁcance of photographs see the reception of Sergei 
Obrastsov’s travelogue described in Gilburd, ‘Books and Borders’, 242–7.  
[41] Hunt, Life is Meeting, 121.  
[42] Dunsheath, Guest of the Soviets, 126. On the signiﬁcance of the space project to boost Soviet 
citizens’ conﬁdence see Magnúsdóttir, ‘‘‘Be careful’’’, 117f.  
[43] Simonov, ‘Na vysshei tochke’, 360f. Simonov explicitly criticized the writer Pavel Luknitski and 
the former president of the mountaineering section David Zatulovski, who had both evidently 
been overtaken by the rapid shift in public discourse.  
[44] D. Zatulovski, ‘Na Pik Korzhenevskoi’: Sovetski Sport, 3 Nov. 1953, 3; K. Kuz’min and  
A. Suslov ‘Pochemu ne razvivaetsia vysotnyi al’pinizm?’: Sovetski Sport, 4 Feb. 1954, 6.  
[45] Plenary session VSA, 1946: GARF f. 7576, op. 14, d. 38, l. 22 
[46] This was a common complaint of mountaineers; see for example GARF f. 7576, op. 14, d. 36, 
ll. 146–7, 153 (Plenary session VSA, 1950); d. 48, l. 7–8. (1953).  
[47] Correspondence, 1952: GARF f. 5451, op. 32, d. 437, l. 6.  
[48] GARF f. 5451, op. 32, d. 437, l. 7.  
[49] Prozumenshchikov, Bol’shoi sport, 273–8.  
[50] Meeting of the VSA, 17 Dec. 1954: GARF f. 7576, op. 30, d. 150, l. 4.  
[51] An anonymous account of a former interpreter in these Soviet-Chinese preparation talks 
insists that it was the Soviet mountaineers who brought up the idea of a joint expedition. 
Published on a pro-Chinese website on Tibet, this source certainly needs to be used with 
care, but many hitherto unknown details from the Chinese side seem plausible and add to our 
knowledge: see ‘Inside Story Behind Conquest of Qomolangmo’, available online at http:// 
www.tibetinfor.com/en/services/peakzone/mountaineer/e/e.htm, accessed 27 Dec. 2007.  
[52] Filimonov, ‘Doroga na Everest’, 58–9.  
[53] Ibid., 87.  
[54] Gippenreiter, ‘Mount Everest’, 113. On the uprising and deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, 
see Jian, ‘Tibetan Rebellion’, esp. 71–101.  
[55] Troianov, ‘Svershilos’, 23. On the 1960 expedition whose success was long doubted see also 
‘Inside Story Behind Conquest of Qomolangmo’ (as in note 51).  
[56] Other Soviet advisers and ‘experts’ to China were also ambivalent about their experience: see 
Kaple, ‘Soviet Advisors’, 128–32.  
[57] Filimonov, ‘Doroga na Everest’, 71 (quote), 72, 88, 94, 145. For the situation in 1958 see Jian, 
‘Tibetan Rebellion’, 68–70.  
[58] The Soviet climbers had the impression that the Panchen Lama knew exactly what they were 
up to: Filimonov, ‘Doroga na Everest’, 60, 71–71, 151.  
[59] Ibid., 60, 69, 79, 84–6.  
[60] When in 1955, Soviet mountaineers had ﬁrst trained their Chinese colleagues, none of them 
had any previous mountaineering experience: Arkin, ‘S pobedoi’, 7. See also Filimonov, 
‘Doroga na Everest’, 165.  
[61] Zubok, ‘The Mao-Krushchev Conversations’; Kramer, ‘The USSR Foreign Ministry’s Appraisal 
of Sino-Soviet Relations’, Kaple, ‘Soviet Advisors’, 130–6.  
[62] Filimonov, ‘Doroga na Everest’, 63, 91f.  
[63] Belopukhov, Ia – spinal’nik, 82. Political allegiance was certainly a criterion – even the Tibetan 
porters were chosen from among party or Communist youth league members: Filimonov, 
‘Doroga na Everest’, 78.  
[64] Beletsky, ‘Mountaineering’, 329. Beletski and Kuzmin, ‘V gorakh’, 71.  
[65] Beletski and Kuzmin, ‘V gorakh’, 71. Interaction  with Chinese mountaineers was hardly 
mentioned, but it was underlined that a rock from the summit of Mustag-Ata was now on 
display in the Alpine Club: Bugaev, ‘Druzhba voskhoditelei’, 348–50.  
[66] Bogachev and Buianov, ‘Na Pik Stalina’, 100f.  
[67] In the words of Mike O’Mahony, ‘the representation of ﬁzkultura practices […] provided a 
useful prism through which complex sociological and political concerns could be articulated 
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effectively’: O’Mahony, Sport in the USSR, 171. For a sketch of the sportsman during the 
Thaw see Vail and Genis, 60-e, 206–13; Makoveeva, ‘Soviet Sports’, 18–25.  
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